Abusive exploitation of Standard Essential Patents: a competition law analysis of the refusal to license under FRAND terms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18256/2238-0604.2026.v22i.5362Keywords:
Standard Essential Patents; FRAND; Abuse of Dominant Position; Refusal to License; Competition Law; Intellectual Property.Abstract
The refusal to license standard essential patents (SEPs) under FRAND terms by a dominant rightsholder is subject to increasing scrutiny by competition authorities in Brazil and abroad. This paper examines the conditions under which such conduct constitutes an abuse of dominant position under Article 36, §3, IV, of Brazilian Competition Law (Law No. 12,529/2011). Based on a bibliographic and documentary analysis of national and international literature on SEPs and FRAND commitments, it examines the landmark Huawei v. ZTE ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union and analyses the nascent experience of CADE, with particular attention to the administrative inquiry opened against Ericsson in April 2025. The paper concludes that Brazilian competition law already provides the normative tools to address such abuse but lacks systematic case law and clear analytical standards. Based on these findings, the paper proposes a concrete agenda for CADE, including the adoption of a procedural standard analogous to the European model and an institutional coordination with INPI for the issuance of a sector-specific guidance document.
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