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Teoria institucional e decisões colegiadas: novos parâmetros de análise / Institutional theory and collective decisions: new analysis parameters
Resumo
RESUMO: Este artigo possui por objeto, a partir de abordagem multidisciplinar, a investigação das decisões colegiadas, das premissas que incentivam sua instituição, dos problemas que podem provocar e dos requisitos necessários para que realmente produzam melhores resultados. Pretende-se, a partir disso, indicar as precauções e informações que deverão adotadas e antevistas para a prescrição de desenhos institucionais apropriados para que decisões mais racionais sejam produzidas. Busca-se, pois, discutir as perspectivas teóricas que recomendam irrefletidamente instituições colegiadas sem a adequada reflexão do desenho institucional dos incentivos internos e institucionais dos agentes. Tem-se, assim, que a hipótese se baseia na demonstração de que colegiados nem sempre decidirão melhor por imperfeição dos desenhos institucionais, e, nestes casos, a agregação de indivíduos, inclusive de juízes, não produzirá benefícios, podendo, inclusive, produzir piores resultados.
Palavras-Chave: Decisões colegiados. Desenho institucional. Incentivos.
ABSTRACT: This paper has as its object, from a multidisciplinary approach, the investigation of collegiate decisions, assumptions that encourage their institution, problems they may cause and necessary requirements for they really produce better results. It is intended thereby indicate the precautions and information to be considered for prescribing institutional designs appropriate for making more rational decisions. The paper intends to discuss the theoretical perspectives that recommend thoughtlessly collegiate institutions without proper reflection of institutional and incentives of agents. The hypothesis is based on evidence that collegiate bodies not always take betters decision because of the imperfection of institutional designs, and in these cases aggregating individuals, including judges, have no benefit and may have worse results.
Keywords: collegiate decisions; self-centered decisions; institutional design
Palavras-chave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18256/2238-0604.2017.v13i3.1552
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