Ponderando direitos e interesses: objeções à tese da assimetria de Frederick Schauer

Matthias Klatt

Resumo


Fred Schauer argumenta que o último passo do teste de proporcionalidade, a ponderação, está sujeita a uma assimetria significativa. Embora se pudesse ponderar interesses, direitos não poderiam ser ponderados, sob pena do status normativo dos direitos ser destruído. Se essa assimetria existir, a aplicabilidade da ponderação seria significativamente limitada. Inicialmente, será analisada a tese da assimetria e discutido os seus pontos fortes e fracos. Em seguida, será demonstrado a possibilidade de acomodar os fundamentos da tese de Schauer em consideração a ponderação na teoria dos princípios. Por fim, a tese de Schauer será rejeitada. Este artigo confirma que a aplicação da proporcionalidade suporta a ponderação de direitos e interesses.


Palavras-chave


Principles Theory; Balancing; Rights and Interests

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Referências


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.18256/2238-0604.2021.v17i1.4495

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